Secretary of State John Kerry says the United States and Russia have agreed to steps that, "if implemented in good faith" could successfully address two problems killing the prospects for peace in Syria: the "continued indiscriminate attacks" of the Assad regime on civilian populations; and the ongoing presence of "Jebhat al-Nusrah, the al-Qaida branch in Syria."
Good faith implementation is everything. And the absence of an American "or else" does not increase its prospects.
Kerry is trying to play diplomatic judo to make Moscow act consistent with its words. Russia intervened militarily in Syria with the pretense of fighting terrorism. Yet instead of focusing its firepower on Daesh (ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State) or the Nusrah Front, it has mainly targeted non-jihadist rebels. Moscow wants to marginalize nationalist opposition to Assad to manufacture a binary choice: Assad or al-Qaida.
Kerry is trying to cajole Moscow into a less cynical approach through a Jordan-based "Joint Implementation Group" [JIG] that would expand American-Russian coordination to military operations against Nusrah, Russia's stated target of choice. Kerry conditions cooperation on much lower violence and a framework for political transition in Syria. Moscow has already agreed in writing to each. Only its actions have been totally at variance with both.
Kerry's prospects would soar were he backed (for example) by an American naval task force in the eastern Mediterranean. Such a task force was persuasive during the 2013 chemical red line episode, which resulted ultimately in the removal of much of the regime's chemical weapons inventory and capability. But Kerry is, in the words of Arthur Miller, "a man way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a shoeshine." A recent Department of State dissent cable, if adopted as policy, could give Kerry leverage by creating the credible threat of military force he needs to discourage Assad regime terror bombing of civilian neighborhoods.
Kerry's challenges are three: the willingness and ability of Russia to ground Assad's murderous air force; the readiness of Moscow to subject its own military targeting in Syria to an American veto; and the reluctance of Washington to deploy anything resembling a credible "or else" in the face of continuing civilian slaughter. Civilians on the bullseye kills diplomacy, promotes al-Qaida, puts allies and friends at risk, and deepens a humanitarian abomination.
According to a leaked, American-drafted document, the establishment of the coordinating body is to be preceded by the "suspension of all offensive ground and air operations" against civilians and those parties (including the mainstream Syrian opposition) that signed up months ago to a "cessation of hostilities" Only when violence is reduced would the JIG come into being.
Yet it is not at all clear that Moscow can or wants to compel Assad's compliance. If able and willing Russia could turn off the bombing of civilian residential neighborhoods right now. Why it has not is an interesting question. But Kerry's plan cannot take effect unless and until Moscow acts.
The leaked document specifies that "Only those targets that both participants [the United States and Russia] agree are actionable will be further developed for strikes." An American veto on Russian airstrikes would certainly reduce – if not eliminate – attacks on hospitals, schools, markets and mosques. The risk to the United States is reputational. Russia could use an "imminent threats" loophole to evade the mutual veto and do something unseemly. On balance, however, faithful implementation of a plan that focuses on the Nusrah Front, entails a mutual veto, requires Russia "to provide the JIG advance notice of all regime air operations," and spares civilians would be worth the risk.
But what if things do go wrong? What if the Assad regime persists in targeting civilians? What if regime and Russian attacks continue against non-al-Qaida targets? What is the penalty? According to the leaked document, "either participant may pull out of the JIG" if the coordination arrangement fails to serve its purpose.
Well yes. One presumes the United States would not wish to be associated with an agenda of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet is it wholly inadmissible for Washington to consider – as the State Department dissenters recommended – creating a credible threat of military force? Is the Assad regime's free ride for collective punishment and mass homicide a given for the life of the Obama administration?
The answer probably centers on another key party to Syria's destruction and gradual emptying: Iran. Tehran in Syria is all-in. Bashar al-Assad's subordination to it on all matters related to Hezbollah – the Lebanese militia serving as the engine of Iranian intervention in the Arab world – is total. It makes him an asset of incalculable value to Tehran.
The nuclear deal with Iran was and remains the top Middle Eastern priority of the Obama administration. The administration believes that to push back hard against Assad regime depredations would be to tempt Tehran to abandon the deal. This is why John Kerry operates in a leverage-free environment.
One prays for Kerry's success. One bets on it only to the extent an appetite for long-shot wagers exists. It may take a new president – one not paralyzed by the Iran nuclear deal – to give diplomacy in Syria a fighting chance.
Frederic C. Hof, director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, served as a special adviser for transition in Syria at the State Department in 2012.
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