The federal government had a watchful eye on Osama bin Laden long before he masterminded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He formed al-Qaida in 1988, was banished from Saudi Arabia in 1992, and was forced out of Sudan in 1996 – all before declaring a war against the United States by way of series of bombings and related attacks. It was that history, in fact, that led the FBI to place him on the Ten Most Wanted Fugitives and Most Wanted Terrorists list following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings that he orchestrated.
But it was 9/11 that caused the name bin Laden to infiltrate mainstream vernacular. And it was then that the United States and its allies found themselves rapidly entwined in a global war unlike any other they had seen before. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military was forced to revamp and rethink the strategy for combat. The enemy extended beyond specific geographic boundaries, was bound less by political loyalties as philosophical ones, and used tactics that went well beyond conventional acts of war.
But bin Laden’s influence on defense – on government at large, in fact – was as profound at home in the US. The 9/11 attacks spurred the biggest reorganization the federal government had ever seen. The US watched the quick creation of the Homeland Security Department, the second-largest agency in government with 180,000 employees at the time. There was newfound reliance on, and skepticism about, private sector contractors to help combat an unfamiliar enemy. And there was rapid transformation in how agencies store and share intelligence information, emphasizing the need for more sweeping access.
"We suddenly needed to go from a Cold War strategy of need-to-know, to a strategy of need-to-share," Tom Ridge, who rapidly went from Pennsylvania governor to assistant to the president for homeland security to the first DHS secretary,
told Federal Times in December 2015. "If you wanted to know what the biggest challenge was at the outset, it was securing relevant information in a timely way."
Indeed, top of mind to both government and the American people was the question of how the terrorists were able to achieve such a sophisticated plot against the United States. Answering that question of became the top priority "even before the ink was dry" on the 2002 Homeland Security Act, Ridge said.
Companies new and old sprouted up to support the counterterrorism mission in the wake of 9/11, both by filling in operational gaps at DHS and soon after providing intelligence and military support in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That reliance on private-sector companies spurred skepticism among the public and within Congress that questioned whether they’d place mission interests above their bottom line – skepticism that transformed to distrust when allegations of fraud and waste emerged, followed by the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse by contractors and government personnel.
"The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, two of the most searing results of 9/11, opened the door to the politicization of acquisition – the use of real or perceived acquisition problems as emblematic of/proxies for disagreement on broader policy," said Stan Soloway, former deputy undersecretary of defense at the Pentagon.
This article is part of a larger Defense News 30-year anniversary project, showcasing the people, programs and innovations from the last three decades that most shaped the global security arena. Go to defensenews.com/30th to see all of our coverage.
Jill Aitoro is editor of Defense News. She is also executive editor of Sightline Media's Business-to-Government group, including Defense News, C4ISRNET, Federal Times and Fifth Domain. She brings over 15 years’ experience in editing and reporting on defense and federal programs, policy, procurement, and technology.
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