TAIPEI – There is a possibility that China will upset the order of East Asian security, said the sixth annual China Security Report issued by the Tokyo-based National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), dubbed "The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and the PLA Strategy."
CX-1 Missile, 2014 Zhuhai Airshow
Photo Credit: Wendell Minnick
H6 Bomber, 2014 Zhuhai Airshow
Photo Credit: Wendell Minnick
Released last week, the report examines the major influences propelling military modernization in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), air force, navy, and Second Artillery Force, and the potential these influences will have on the region and on the US military's traditional safeguarding role since World War II.
"Each of these services has its own basic strategy, and the Report analyzes the overall trend toward greater military strength accompanying efforts to put those strategies fully into effect," wrote Tetsuo Murooka, NIDS director, Security Studies Department.
As the PLA has become more active at sea on a broader scale, it has repeatedly obstructed US military vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea, which are operating in accord with international rules. The Chinese military has stepped up realistic joint exercises in the Western Pacific and sought various ways to strengthen its capacity for nuclear deterrence directed at the US, including the deployment of new strategic nuclear submarines.
The report was written by Masafumi Iida, NIDS senior fellow, Northeast Asia Division, Regional Studies Department, with expertise in China's foreign policy, and Shinji Yamaguchi, NIDS research fellow, Asia and Africa Division, Regional Studies Department, with expertise in civil-military relations in China and Chinese security policy.
"If the PLA were to continue its challenges to the US presence in East Asia, and if such challenges were to prove effective, the existing order of security in East Asia could change dramatically," said the report. "And if the US should step up its actions designed to maintain that order in the face of such efforts by China, this would necessarily mean an increase in tension in their bilateral relationship."
The report indicates that for now on, China can be expected to strengthen its presence in the offshore waters and airspace with the aim of establishing superiority in disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. The goal is to prevent interference by the US in China's core interests.
In the East China Sea, Chinese naval vessels have locked onto a Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) destroyer with fire control radar, and Chinese fighters at times have come very close to JSDF aircraft. In the South China Sea, Chinese naval craft have obstructed the course of US Navy vessels, while Chinese fighters have at times drawn dangerously close to US patrol aircraft.
Strengthening its capabilities to attack US naval forces approaching from Hawaii or the US mainland in waters distant from the Chinese mainland is an important means for the PLA Navy (PLAN) to deter US interference and to reduce the effectiveness of interference.
China has been engaged in land reclamation and bolstering its facilities on seven features, including Johnson South Reef (Chiguajiao) and Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshujiao) in the Spratly Islands (Nansha), in the process generating international concern. China's construction of a 3,000-meter-class runway, which seems intended for possible use by the new Xian H-6K strategic long-range bomber has attracted particular international attention.
At the 2014 National People's Congress, a proposal was raised, but not acted on, for an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) for the South China Sea. An ADIZ was implemented for the East China Sea in 2013. There are fears that as China expands land reclamation in the South China Sea with the establishment of air bases and air defense facilities that an ADIZ is inevitable.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is making ever more frequent flights over the East China Sea, and JSDF fighter aircraft scrambles to intercept Chinese aircraft have increased at a rapid pace as well, from thirty-eight in 2009 to 464 in 2014.
The updated version of the H-6K has an effective range of 2,000 kilometers and can carry the CJ-10 (DF-10) air-to-ground cruise missile with the introduction of the D-30KP2 engine will increase its range to 3,500 kilometers. This could put Guam within H-6K striking range. As of 2015, thirty-six H-6K bombers have been deployed with the PLAAF and this number can be expected to increase.
The military is also deploying another Guam-killer, the 4,000 kilometer DF-26 conventional strike ballistic missile, which first appeared in the September 2015 military parade.
The 2015 version of The Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA National Defense University indicates that the US military maintains the ratio of attack, defense, and support in its fighting forces at 2:1:1, and it is clear that the PLAAF has not yet attained such a balance. To achieve that balance, it will be important to develop heavy transport and inflight refueling craft. To attain sufficient capability in areas such as projecting military force and in-flight refueling, some research suggests that the PLAAF will need at least four hundred additional Xian Y-20 strategic heavy transports.
There are efforts to increase attack capabilities, most likely through continued deployment and development of fighters capable of attacking targets on the ground. Stealth capability and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) will be needed to increase the ability of fighter aircraft to penetrate the enemy's air defense. China is already engaged in such efforts, as shown by the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter and unmanned aerial combat aircraft for terminal high altitude long endurance missions.
The PLAAF will seek greater capabilities in air defense and missile defense. China appears to have secured some level of defense capability in terminal-phase missile interception by importing the Russian S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2 and deploying the locally-built HQ-9 and HQ-15/18. It is also continuing to make progress in negotiations with Russia for purchase of the S-400, which has a range of 400 kilometers. Progress is also continuing in development of anti-stealth radar.
The PLA Second Artillery Force, reorganized into the PLA Rocket Force at the end of December 2015, has moved from a military branch dealing only with nuclear weapons to a service, which possesses both nuclear and conventional forces. China's nuclear strategy can be characterized by preeminence of the political, a declaration of no first use, a gradual increase in the number of warheads, and removal and separate storage of nuclear warheads during peacetime. It seeks to maintain a reliable second-strike capability and is working to make qualitative improvements in its nuclear force. It is converting its reserves of ballistic missiles to solid fuel, is transitioning to vehicle-borne mobile launch capacity, and is making progress in introduction of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
While China has a limited number of nuclear warheads, it is increasing that number. It is estimated that China's arsenal of nuclear warheads in 2015 amounted to 260, far less than those of Russia, 7,500, and of the US, which had 7,260 nuclear warheads. Even though the Chinese arsenal has not been growing at a rapid pace, it did double from only 130 in 2006.
In 1985, China had no conventional ballistic missiles, but since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, China has made major increases in short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), and since the latter half of the 2000s, it has been building up its medium-range missiles. China's plans to use the SRBMs to pulverize Taiwan's runways. As of 2015, the report notes that the number of SRBM launchers was 200 to 300, with at least 1,200 missiles available for strike missions on Taiwan.
Regarding intermediate-range missiles, China has deployed the DF-21C medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21C's range permits it to reach all of the countries in the region, and the DF-21 was used in 2007 for testing in destroying a satellite.
The DF-21D ASBM is called an "aircraft carrier killer" and the development program was inspired by the deployment of the US Navy Seventh Fleet during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. During the crisis, the Chinese fired DF-15 (M-9) SRBMs off the northern and southern coasts of Taiwan. The presence of a large US aircraft carrier task force turned China's attention to ways to prevent such a close approach by carrier strike groups in the future.
DF-21D appears to be the answer to that problem and deployment is underway. It is thought to combine inertial guidance and terminal radar guidance. Since determination of the target ship's location is vital to anti-ship operations, both space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and ground-based over-the-horizon radar serve important functions.
The development of supersonic and hypersonic air-to-ground cruise missiles is important to China's plan to dominate the Asia-Pacific region by projecting power further from its shores. As an example of this, the report cites the unveiling of the CX-1 ramjet propelled supersonic missile at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow.
The report is also concerned about China's new WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). In January 2014, China conducted the first WU-14 flight test, followed by a total of four tests by June 2015. This HGV is mounted on a ballistic missile and reenters the atmosphere at a speed of Mach 10, passes through near space and heads for its target, making early detection difficult. It is expected to be able to pass through the US missile defense system without interdiction.
Since it soars through near-space altitudes, mounting the WU-14 on a ballistic missile is expected to give a ballistic missile much greater range than when it is fitted with a normal warhead. The WU-14 is still in the testing stage, and it is unclear just how it will be used, but there is no denying its ability to carry a nuclear warhead.
PDF report available at this LINK.
