Elissa Slotkin, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs since 2012, will take over for Chollet, who is heading to the German Marshall Fund as a counselor and senior adviser.
Q. Since you assumed this position, what have been some of the biggest shocks for the US government?
A. I started this job the first week of June 2012, so we were a year-plus into the so-called Arab Spring and dealing with the continuing repercussions of this generational change in the Middle East. But Syria, Egypt, Israeli security issues, Iran, Libya, Iraq have dominated my time, as well as the NATO piece of the Afghanistan effort and our relationship with Europe, which is an enduring effort. A year ago we were worried about the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship, how would it be relevant to people. And of course, the events of the last year with Russia and Ukraine have focused people again on threats to European security and the unfinished business, really, still coming out of the end of the Cold War.
Q. There seems to be a shift afoot in US security policy with more and more US training and partner missions in Eastern Europe but base closures and consolidation in Western Europe. Is there any tension there with allies?
A. I see it as a continuing evolution of our force posture in Europe, as we're continually trying to make it relevant to modern threats. Also, the evolution in our discussion with our European allies about the division of labor between us. Despite all these changes and the efficiencies that we're gaining by closing certain facilities [in Europe], while also improving infrastructure in other parts of Europe and rotating forces through Central and Eastern Europe, the bottom line is we're still deeply committed to European security. The trans-Atlantic relationship is the cornerstone relationship for the United States writ large. It's not just about European security, it's about US/Europe working together in North Africa, working together in the Middle East, and even working together in Asia.
Q. So the conversations with European allies have focused on engagement not only on the continent, but globally?
A. In those conversations, we take a lot of care to ensure that we're working closely with our European partners just as we're making decisions to ensure that there isn't a perception that we are seeking to withdraw at all, because it's the opposite. What we've been able to accomplish with our European partners in the last year alone is a testament to that. There is a lot of skepticism in Washington among the expert community about Europe and the US being willing to step up together to support Ukraine, to ensure that we have the capability in place in Europe to send a clear message to Russia that the NATO alliance remains strong and that we're all committed to Article V, and that European partners would be willing to put real skin in the game in the fight against [the Islamic State group].
Q. France, the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands appeared eager to take part in Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria.
A. The fact that so many European partners sought us out to contribute in a meaningful way militarily in the efforts in Iraq and Syria is significant. I think, frankly, it's underappreciated. This was not something where the US was going around the world pressuring allies to contribute. This is a situation when allies were coming to us wanting to contribute. Number one, they see this as a shared security interest, the effort against [the Islamic State group]. Events just in the last week in Paris only underscore that. And also, they recognize their role as responsible partners. That doesn't mean we don't have huge challenges with our European partners, whether it be on their defense budgets, their capabilities, in some cases the political will. But I tend to see this as largely a good news story.
Q. And what of the newer Eastern European and Baltic partners?
A. With some of our newer partners, the essential Eastern European partners, one of the things that they've been asking us for help for — and we've been willing to do — is they would like to not fly Russian helicopters and not drive Russian armored vehicles. They're looking to us for help. Now, those are budget decisions in their governments, they're procurement decisions, so they're difficult because, like the United States, all of Europe has suffered financial austerity recently.
Q. Is there any movement toward doing more partnered training activities with Ukrainian military?
A. Yes. We've already agreed to help the Ukrainians build a national guard force, and that's about $19 million in funds that were allocated last year to help do that. That hopefully will be getting underway in the coming months. We're very open to the idea that that becomes a first step in further training for the Ukrainian military. That, of course, will require additional resources and we're going to have to continue the conversation with the Ukrainians about what they need and want. The Ukrainian military, even before the events of the last year, were too corrupt, not very well run, not very well organized. So we've worked very hard to put in place a good consultative mechanism with the Ukrainians to talk about their defense needs.
Q. In building this national guard force, would US soldiers be in Ukraine doing the training, or would this be somewhere else in Europe?
A. It would largely be elsewhere. There are parts of Ukraine in the West that are far away from the fighting where we and NATO have done exercises. So there are facilities in Ukraine, but we can also do it outside of the country. I don't anticipate that any of this training will require significant US presence.
Q. Is the US involved in training the Iraqis to build their proposed new largely Sunni national guard?
A. I don't think the training has begun on the national guard, but it's not the US doing it. Helping train an Iraqi National Guard that includes Sunni, Shi'a, Kurd, that's consistent with our overall approach, obviously, to have an Iraq that's unified. But it's not the US doing it directly, or our partners for that matter, the Europeans or others. It's an Iraqi effort.
Q. What are some of the biggest issues facing your successor in the Middle East and emerging areas of interest in Africa as far as counterterrorism and security assistance initiatives?
A. If you look at the swath of territory from Northern Mali to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, you have what was known by Zbigniew Brzezinski as the "arc of instability." You have borders that matter less and less, non-state actors who are using any means they can acquire — whether weapons or technology and communications — to try to foment instability in that area but also, of course, to strike outside [that region]. There are weak governments, security threats, population movements and massive humanitarian problems — and they are all problems that don't know our bureaucratic stovepipes, so that can be a challenge.
I think the other challenge will be what Russia is doing. On the security side of it, where could this lead, and how does this make us think anew about European security issues and the relationships and the force posture issues or the defense spending issues? One big challenge is how that conversation takes place within the context of smaller budgets. So, how we do more with less.
Q. The price of a barrel of oil has fallen by more than half over the past several months, and it's flirting with $50 a barrel. What kind of effect do you think that may have on the activities of Iran, Russia and Venezuela?
A. Particularly those countries that you named, Russia, Venezuela, some others have used the riches they were able to acquire due to the high price of oil to fund some pretty negative behavior. So to the extent that it makes those countries more focused on their internal stability and their economic woes, and leaves them less time to think about ways that they can destabilize neighbors, that's a good thing.
Q. Several years after the Obama administration announced its "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region, where does that stand? It seems the administration continues to struggle to explain what it's trying to do.
A. I think the key word is "balance." It's not meant in any way to diminish our core relationships in Europe. In fact, our message to our European friends has been "rebalance with us." We all have an interest in Asia-Pacific. This isn't just an American thing. I think the difficulty is that it's a big strategic play, and is often hard to measure in the day-to-day, hour-to-hour news cycles that we live in. So you have to just stick with it, be patient about it and understand that the payoff may not be appreciated for another several years, decades perhaps.
The theory coming in for this administration was that we have been out of balance coming into the end of the 2000s, and that we had expended far too many resources on wars in the Middle East. And while that was happening, a big shift in geopolitics was occurring that we were not as much a part of as we should've been.■
By Paul McLeary in Washington.
