Combat in Ukraine and the results of Asia-Pacific theater wargames have exposed the existential need for greater capacity in our defense-industrial base. Increasing U.S. production is a critical part of the solution, but it is not the only part. As illustrated by ongoing U.S. and allied efforts to scour the world for 155mm ammunition to support Ukrainian forces, engaging the industrial capacity of American partners and allies is an essential, mutually beneficial and cost-effective way to increase industrial capacity and resilience. That’s why we need to adopt a “Build Allied” approach for current and future contingencies.
Here’s how we can do that.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy references allies and partners 32 ,times including the imperative of that cooperation to build “enduring advantages” in the joint force. Recent versions have articulated similar objectives, but today’s environment has become incredibly strong with robust administration leadership, bipartisan congressional support and increased allied defense investment to address defense-industrial capacity shortfalls.
There are a significant number of vehicles such as the Australia, United Kingdom and United States partnership known as AUKUS; the national technology and industrial base; reciprocal defense procurement memorandums of understanding, or RDP MOU; and others to enable robust industrial collaboration.
Unfortunately, while U.S. forces have operated and shared intelligence with close allies for decades, vigorous international industrial collaboration has regularly foundered on the shoals of obstacles such as export controls, technology security and foreign disclosure processes, aspects of the defense acquisition system, and “Buy America” sentiments.
George Mason’s Baroni Center for Government Contracting has recently published a report that lays out a path for a “Build Allied” approach that truly moves the needle for the U.S. and our allies. Four broad sets of actions are needed to achieve this “Build Allied” vision.
First, the Department of Defense should make international industrial collaboration a central component of the defense acquisition system. Senior-level guidance and actions are critical to help drive this increased prioritization from requirements development through contract awards and into sustainment.
The department needs, for example, to reduce the 18-month backlog in getting approved Foreign Military Sales cases on contract and to facilitate the early involvement of allied and partner companies in DoD programs, which will spur greater capacity to support U.S. national security interests across the globe.
Second, Congress and the administration should focus on overcoming technology transfer and other obstacles. After repeated failed efforts over the past two decades, Congress should grant Australia and the United Kingdom waivers to International Traffic in Arms Regulations for classified and unclassified programs, which will be critical for the success of AUKUS and similar efforts.
It is heartening to see recent administration testimony and House Foreign Affairs Committee deliberations supportive of these types of legislative changes to the Arms Export Control Act. Congress should also increase eligibility from Canada to all national technology and industrial base countries for Defense Production Act Title III industrial base projects. The administration’s recent legislative proposal to add Australia and the U.K. as domestic sources under the DPA is a great step in this regard.
Some criticism of this DPA change underscores the importance of the third set of actions: making the tangible domestic industrial base benefits of international industrial collaboration more widely known across the government contracting community. The DoD or Congress should request a study assessing the impact of the 28 RDP MOU countries’ contributions to the U.S. defense-industrial base. This would increase awareness of the benefits of RDP MOUs and quantify the counterproductive nature of additional Buy America legislation. Our collective effort should instead be laser-focused on reducing industrial base vulnerabilities coming from China; there is more than enough work to be done on that front.
Fourth, the DoD should focus on scaling efforts like the Defense Exportability Features program to increase the effectiveness of international industrial collaboration. While the DEF program has had modest success in building in defense exportability for programs like the Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, it has continually struggled for funding and attention. Building off the 2022 Ukraine supplemental reprogramming for the DEF program, the DoD and Congress should work to increase the program’s base annual funding to $50 million to focus on capabilities for the pacing China challenge.
To face today’s security challenges, we must accelerate international industrial collaboration to build industrial base capacity and resilience. The recently announced FMS Tiger Team recommendations are critical components of that effort, but we also need system-level efforts that promote and foster a broad mosaic of programs across the entire spectrum of U.S. and allied defense acquisition needs. While many of the building blocks are in place, acting on our report’s recommendations is essential to gain the speed and scale necessary for a successful “Build Allied” approach, which will ultimately be a win-win proposition for the United States as well as our allies and partners.
Jerry McGinn, the executive director of the Greg and Camille Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University, previously served as a senior U.S. Defense Department acquisition official. Michael Roche is a visiting fellow at the center and a professor at the Defense Acquisition University.
